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HIS article provides an update of case law and legislative efforts
that had, or will have, a significant impact on franchise and dealer-
ship law in Texas and the Fifth Circuit. This article also includes
an analysis of recent legislative efforts from the Federal Trade Commis-
sion that will leave a profound mark on franchise businesses for years to
come.
II. FRANCHISE BASICS
A. WHAT IS A FRANCHISE?
Although definitions vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a
franchise can generally be described as a continuing commercial relation-
ship consisting of (1) a significant association between the franchisee's
business and the franchisor's trademarks; (2) payment of a franchise fee;
and (3) the franchisor's right to provide significant assistance to, or exer-
cise significant control of, the franchisee in the operation of its business.'
This black letter definition, however, does not define the entirety of the
relationship nor does it provide the unschooled with any direction for
advising on the relationship. Given the many developments discussed in
this update, it is once again apparent that franchise lawyers must remain
vigilant both to current legislative movements and to case law to advise
their franchise clients on the complexities of the franchise relationship.
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B. THE FRANCHISE RULE
Franchising is governed primarily by laws that require franchisors to
disclose to prospective franchisees certain items about the franchise sys-
tem.2 Under the guidelines set by the North American Securities Admin-
istrators Association ("NASAA"), franchisors are required to provide
very specific information about themselves, the franchise system, the rela-
tionship between the franchisor and the franchisee, and the documents
the franchisee will be required to sign.3 This information is contained in a
document called the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular ("UFOC").
The FTC has its own form of disclosure format under the Franchise
Rule, 4 but has traditionally accepted the NASAA format in lieu of its
own.
5
On August 25, 2004, the Federal Trade Commission (the "Commis-
sion") made public its staff report on the Trade Regulation Rule entitled
"Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and
Business Opportunity Ventures-(Franchise Rule)"'6 (the "Report").
The Report represents the first significant development in the past five
years to the Commission's efforts to revise the federal franchise law. The
Report analyzes the rulemaking effort to date and details the staff's rec-
ommendations to the Commission on proposed amendments to the
Franchise Rule.
The Franchise Rule has been in place since 1978. In 1995, the Commis-
sion began reviewing the Franchise Rule to determine whether changes
were necessary and, if so, to revise the Franchise Rule. In 1997, the Com-
mission published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the
"ANPR") 7 and, two years later, published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (the "NPR") 8 containing the first draft of proposed changes
to the Franchise Rule.
The Report contains the Commission's recommended revisions to the
Franchise Rule. Thus, it provides a glimpse into what will likely become
a new federal franchise law when enacted. The Commission accepted
public comments on the Report until November 12, 2004.
The following summary details some of the key recommendations con-
tained in the Report. The Report contained over 400 pages of recom-
mendations and analysis; therefore, this summary is not an exhaustive
analysis, but instead provides a brief overview of the more significant rec-
2. RUPERT M. BARKOFF & ANDREW C. SELDEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING
121-22 (ABA Publishing 2004).
3. Id. at 98-99.
4. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (2004).
5. Rupert M. Barkoff, Mary Beth Brody & Lane Fisher, The Basics of Disclosure,
IFA 37th Annual Legal Symposium, Tab 8, ii-iii (May 23-25, 2004).
6. Federal Trade Commission, Disclosure Requirements & Prohibitions ConcerningFranchising at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/08/0408franchiseruierpt.pdf (Aug. 2004) [herein-
after Report].
7. Trade Regulation Rule on Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions concerningFranchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 62 Fed. Reg. 9,115 (Feb. 28, 1997).
8. Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,294 (Oct. 22, 1999).
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ommendations proposed by the Commission's staff in order to help the
franchise lawyer prepare for the FTC's potential adoption of the revised
rule.
APPLICATION TO FRANCHISE SALES AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
SALES. The Report recommends revising the Franchise Rule to apply
solely to franchise sales and not to business opportunity sales. The staff
recommended that the Commission establish a yet-unproposed separate
rule to regulate business opportunities.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UFOC GUIDELINES. The Report also recom-
mends that the Commission revise the Franchise Rule's disclosures, based
upon the UFOC Guidelines model, to reduce inconsistencies between the
Franchise Rule and various state pre-sale disclosure laws. The Report
does not recommend mirroring the UFOC Guidelines in all cases, but
rather recommends making the Franchise Rule more similar to the
UFOC Guidelines.
APPLICATION OF THE FRANCHISE RULE TO DOMESTIC FRANCHISE
SALES ONLY-PROPOSED § 436.2. The current Franchise Rule does not
specify whether the pre-sale disclosure requirements apply to interna-
tional franchise sales, and the issue has been the subject of much debate
and uncertainty in the franchise community. Although the Commission
has publicly stated that the Franchise Rule applies to international
franchise sales, it has never sought to enforce it in this manner. In the
ANPR, the Commission noted the following reasons that support the ap-
plication of the Franchise Rule to domestic franchise sales only: (1) the
Commission did not contemplate international franchising when it
promulgated the Franchise Rule; (2) the Franchise Rule's disclosures are
aimed at the domestic market; (3) foreign franchise purchasers are so-
phisticated and do not need the Franchise Rule's protections; (4) attempt-
ing to comply with the Franchise Rule in foreign markets might result in
franchisors disseminating inaccurate or misleading information; and (5)
application of the Franchise Rule to international sales would unnecessa-
rily impede competition. As a result, the staff recommends that the
Franchise Rule specifically apply only to domestic franchise sales and not
to international franchise sales.9
DELIVERY OF DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT-TIMING CHANGES-PRO-
POSED § 4 36.2 (A). The current Franchise Rule requires franchisors to de-
liver the pre-sale disclosure to prospective franchisees at the earlier of (1)
the first personal meeting; and (2) "the time for making disclosures,"
which is ten business days before execution of the franchise agreement or
other binding agreements or payment of any fees in connection with the
franchise sale. 10 The staff recommends eliminating the requirement to
provide disclosure at the first personal meeting. In addition, the staff rec-
ommends requiring franchisors to provide disclosure at least fourteen cal-
endar days (instead of ten business days) before the execution of the
9. Report, supra note 6, at 72; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,299.
10. Report, supra note 6, at 75; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,300.
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franchise agreement or other binding agreements or payment of any fees
in connection with the franchise sale.
PRE-SIGNING CONTRACT REVIEW PERIOD-PROPOSED § 4 36.2(B).
The current Franchise Rule requires franchisors to furnish prospective
franchisees with a copy of the completed franchise agreement at least five
business days before its execution. The staff recommends eliminating the
contract review period entirely, except where the franchisor has materi-
ally altered the terms and conditions of the standard contract attached to
the disclosure document, and such changes were not requested by the
prospective franchisee. When the exception applies and the franchisor
must therefore deliver a completed franchise agreement, the staff recom-
mends allowing the prospective franchisee seven days (instead of five
business days) to review the agreement."
LIABILITY OF THIRD-PARTY BROKERS AND FRANCHISOR EMPLOY-
EES-PROPOSED § 4 36.2(D). The current Franchise Rule holds
franchisors and brokers jointly and severally liable for complying with the
Franchise Rule (e.g., timely furnishing accurate and complete disclosures
to prospective franchisees). The staff recommends altering the rule to
hold franchise sellers (including third-party brokers and franchisor em-
ployees) liable for the content of a disclosure document, only if they ei-
ther directly participated in the document's creation or had authority to
control it.1 2
ITEM 19: EARNINGS CLAIMS-PROPOSED § 436.5(s). The current
Franchise Rule and the UFOC Guidelines permit, but do not require,
franchisors to make earnings claims to prospective franchisees. The staff
recommends that earnings claims remain voluntary. However, it pro-
poses elimination of the current requirement that the earnings claim have
geographic relevance and that franchisors disclose the number and per-
centage of franchisees who have attained the numbers presented in the
earnings claim. The Report asserts that such requirements are unnecessa-
rily restrictive and prevent franchisors from sharing material, truthful
performance information about subgroups of existing franchisees. The
Report also confirmed the staff's position that earnings claims need not
be prepared in accordance with GAAP, reflecting the desire to provide
franchisors with the flexibility to formulate their earnings claims as they
see fit, so long as the representations are reasonable. 13
ITEM 20: OUTLETS AND FRANCHISEE INFORMATION-PROPOSED§ 436.5(T). The staff recommends adopting proposed revisions to Item 20
that were suggested by the NASAA to solve the Item 20 double-counting
problem. NASAA's proposed Item 20 would contain five tables that de-
tail for each of the last three fiscal years (1) the status of a franchisor's
system, including the number of franchised and company-owned outlets
at the beginning and end of each of the last three fiscal years, and the
11. Report, supra note 6, at 80; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,301.
12. Report, supra note 6, at 84; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,301.
13. Report, supra note 6, at 158; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,308.
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total net change; (2) transfers in each state; (3) the turnover rate of
franchised outlets, including the number of franchised outlets at the be-
ginning of the year, new outlets opened, terminations, non-renewals, re-
acquisitions by the franchisor, outlets that ceased to do business, and
outlets at the end of the year; (4) the turnover rate at company-owned
stores, including the number of company-owned outlets at the beginning
of the year, new outlets, reacquired outlets, closed outlets, outlets sold to
franchisees and outlets open at the end of the year; and (5) projected
openings and the number of franchise agreements signed in the previous
year where a store has not yet been opened. The staff also recommends
that the Commission include a new provision in Item 20 that requires a
franchisor selling an existing unit to provide the prospective franchisee
with a history of that unit for the last three fiscal years, including the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of each previous owner and
the reasons for the change in ownership. 14
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS-PROPOSED § 436.5(T). The staff ex-
pressed concern that confidentiality clauses signed in connection with dis-
pute settlements and terminations may impede a prospective franchisee's
ability to conduct due diligence investigations of franchise offerings, and
thwart the goal of pre-sale disclosure. The staff recommends that the
Commission adopt the approach set forth in the NPR, which provides
that if a franchisee signed a contract containing a confidentiality clause in
the last three fiscal years, the franchisor would provide a statement in
Item 20 alerting prospects to the fact that some franchisees may not be
able to speak openly with prospects because of these clauses. The
franchisor has the option of providing the number and percentage of cur-
rent and former franchisees who have signed confidentiality provisions
and the circumstances under which the provisions were signed. The staff
does not recommend disclosure of confidentiality clauses that address
specific contract negotiation terms and conditions. 15
ITEM 21: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS-PROPOSED § 436.5(u). The staff
recommends that Item 21 require the disclosure of a parent's financial
information only in two circumstances: (1) where the parent commits to
perform post-sale obligations for the franchisor; or (2) where the parent
guarantees obligations of the franchisor. The staff also recommends that
the Commission require subfranchisors to furnish financial disclosures in
all instances. "Subfranchisor" only applies to situations where a sub-
franchisor steps into the shoes of the franchisor by selling and performing
post-sale obligations. "Subfranchisor" does not include individuals who,
without any post-sale commitments, act like brokers. The staff also rec-
ommends that Item 21 requires franchisors to attach a copy of any guar-
antee in their disclosures. 16
14. Report, supra note 6, at 172; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,311.
15. Report, supra note 6, at 181; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,311.
16. Report, supra note 6, at 198; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,315.
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AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. The current Franchise Rule and
the UFOC Guidelines require franchisors to include within their disclo-
sure documents audited financial statements prepared according to
GAAP. The staff recommends that the Commission update Item 21 to
require that financial statements be prepared according to U.S. GAAP,
or as permitted by the SEC, subject to any future government mandated
accounting principles. The SEC allows foreign companies registering se-
curities to prepare financial statements using accounting procedures
other than U.S. GAAP under certain circumstances, including the follow-
ing: (1) the statements must be prepared "according to a comprehensive
body of accounting principles;" (2) the company must disclose the specific
comprehensive body of accounting principles used to prepare the state-
ments and explain the material differences between the principles and
U.S. GAAP; (3) the company must reconcile its statements with U.S.
GAAP; and (4) the statements must provide all additional disclosures re-
quired by U.S. GAAP. 17
NEW EXEMprTIONS-PROPOSED § 436.8. The staff recommends retain-
ing the current Franchise Rule exemptions for fractional franchises,
leased departments, oral contracts and franchise sales under $500. The
staff also recommends adding additional exemptions for petroleum mar-
keters and franchisees deemed to be "sophisticated investors." Three so-
phisticated investor exemptions have been proposed: a large investment
exemption, a large business entity-franchisee exemption, and an officer
and owner exemption. 18
THE LARGE INVESTMENT EXEMPTION. The staff recommends adopting
an exemption from the Franchise Rule for franchise sales where the total
investment made in acquiring the franchise totals at least $1 million, ex-
cluding the cost of real estate and excluding any financing provided by
the franchisor. The investment threshold should apply to the purchase of
both single-unit and multiple-unit franchise rights. 19
THE LARGE FRANCHISEE EXEMPTION. The staff recommends adopting
an exemption from the Franchise Rule for franchise sales to large entities.
A "large entity" is an entity that has been in business for at least five
years and has a net worth of at least $5 million. "Entity" includes corpo-
rations, partnerships and similar business arrangements. The staff also
recommends allowing the assets of affiliated entities to be aggregated in
determining whether the $5 million net worth threshold is met.20
THE OFFICER, OWNER AND MANAGER EXEMPTION. The staff recom-
mends allowing sales to owners, operators and those with direct manage-
ment experience over a franchise system to be exempt from the Franchise
Rule when the owner, operator or manager purchases an outlet from
such franchisor. To qualify, the prospective franchisee must have been
17. Report, supra note 6, at 200; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,315.
18. Report, supra note 6, at 225; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,319.
19. Report, supra note 6, at 235; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,321.
20. Report, supra note 6, at 245; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,321.
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employed by the franchisor for at least two years, and the relationship
between the franchisor and prospective franchisee must have existed
within sixty days of the sale. 21
As of January 2005, the Report has not been reviewed or adopted by
the Commission and, therefore, does not have the force of law. Once the
FTC staff provides final comments to the Commission and assuming the
Commission adopts the staff's revised Franchise Rule, the Commission
should issue another notice in the Federal Register, release a statement of
basis and purpose, and announce the effective date of new Rule.
III. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
Many cases during the Survey period analyzed the traditional argu-
ments that defendants assert to contest personal jurisdiction-no mini-
mum contacts exist for Texas courts to obtain personal jurisdiction. In
these cases, the Texas long-arm statute and federal due process require-
ments were applied. The ultimate question was whether sufficient con-
tacts were established by which the defendant purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within Texas, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of Texas laws. The Austin Court of Appeals in
Johnson v. Schlotzsky's, Inc., however, was among the few that went be-
yond this conventional analysis.
In Johnson v. Schlotzsky's, Inc.,22 the appellate court affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of a franchisee's request for special appearance and
severance of contract and tort claims. In this case, Schlotzsky's, Inc. and
its chief executive officer John C. Wooley (collectively, Schlotzsky's) sued
Jeff Johnson for business disparagement, defamation, conspiracy, and
breach of confidentiality agreements. This action arose when Johnson, a
franchisee and area developer for Schlotzsky's for seventeen years, alleg-
edly conveyed confidential and defamatory information to "Yahoo! Fi-
nance BUNZ Message Board" messengers. Johnson filed a special
appearance with respect to the tort claims alleging that Texas courts did
not have specific or general jurisdiction for the tort claims. The district
court held, and the appellate court affirmed, that the tort and contract
claims were not severable and that the Texas courts, therefore, had per-
sonal jurisdiction over all claims. 23
Schlotzsky's is a publicly traded franchise restaurant chain with loca-
tions throughout the United States, with its corporate headquarters in
Austin, Texas. Over seventeen years, Schlotzsky's and Johnson entered
into five agreements-two franchise agreements, an area developer
agreement, a management agreement, and a unit development agree-
21. Report, supra note 6, at 249; Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 57,322.
22. Johnson v. Schlotzsky's, Inc., No. 03-03-00468-CV, 2003 WL 22964291, at *5 (Tex.




ment. The third agreement, the area developer agreement, provided that
all disputes arising out of the agreement would be arbitrated in Austin.
As a franchisee, Johnson sent monthly royalty payments to Schlotzsky's
corporate headquarters in Austin, and as an area developer, Johnson re-
ceived a check from Schlotzsky's Austin headquarters for each franchise
that he sold, as well as monthly royalty checks for a percentage of sales.24
After over ten years of Johnson's business relationship with Schlotz-
sky's, Schlotzsky's began to implement changes to its policies and busi-
ness methods, which Johnson opposed. Johnson, therefore, initiated an
arbitration proceeding in Austin against Schlotzsky's under his area de-
veloper agreement. By a settlement agreement, the parties settled the
arbitration and litigation in September 2001. This settlement agreement
contained a confidentiality clause "forbidding either party from disclosing
the terms of the settlement and anything said and exchanged in the nego-
tiations leading up to the settlement." When Johnson's alleged state-
ments were posted on an internet message board, this litigation ensued
based on breach of the settlement and confidentiality agreement. Be-
cause Texas law governed the settlement agreement and included a fo-
rum-selection clause placing venue in Travis County, Texas, Johnson did
not contest the court's jurisdiction for breach of the confidentiality claim
based on the contract. Johnson did contest jurisdiction over the tort
claims, alleging that the claims were severable and no jurisdiction existed.
The court rejected this argument.25
The court said that a claim was properly severable if: (1) the contro-
versy involved more than one cause of action; (2) the severed claim was
one that would be proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted;
and (3) the severed claim was not so interwoven with the remaining ac-
tion that they involved the same facts and issues. Furthermore, the con-
trolling reasons for a severance were to do justice and to avoid prejudice
and further inconvenience. Although Johnson met the first two require-
ments of severability, he failed to meet the third requirement because the
tort claims were interwoven with the contract claim. Moreover, the con-
tract and tort claims involved the same facts, arose out of a single course
of conduct, and involved the same issues. Therefore, justice would be
better served by enabling a single fact-finder to consider the contractual
relationship of the parties, the allegedly tortious conduct, and the inter-
play between the two.2 6
In addition, the Schlotzsky's court held that independent of the sever-
ance issue, the district court would still have personal jurisdiction over
Johnson because of his Texas contacts. To establish personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
falls within the reach of the Texas long-arm statute. The long-arm statute
reaches as far as the federal constitutional requirement of due process
24. Id. at *1.
25. Id. at *2.
26. Id. at *3.
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will permit. The appellate court affirmed that a Texas court may assert
personal jurisdiction over actions that are related to the defendant's con-
tacts with the state, as long as the contacts stem from the defendant's
purposeful conduct rather than from the plaintiff's unilateral activity,
such that the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court" in Texas to defend the claims.
27
Furthermore, the court held that a defendant's contacts with a forum
could give rise to either specific or general jurisdiction. It held that for a
court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, two
requirements must be met: (1) the defendant's contacts with the forum
must be purposeful, and (2) the cause of action must arise from or relate
to those contacts. Most importantly, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
must not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
2 8
Although Johnson challenged the court's exercise of jurisdiction based
on the tort claims, neither the district nor appellate court analyzed juris-
diction based on the Internet bulletin messages-the subject of the tort
claims. Instead, the appellate court specifically focused on Johnson's bus-
iness relationship and contacts with Schlotzsky's as a franchisee and area
developer. The court held that the record was clear that Johnson's con-
tacts with Texas were purposeful, thereby satisfying the first requirement
of exercising specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Like-
wise, the court held that the tort claims arose from or related to those
contacts since the tort claims would likely not exist but for Johnson's pur-
poseful contacts with Texas, especially the settlement agreement.
29
Finally, the appellate court considered whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Texas courts consider five factors when making this determina-
tion: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state
in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining conve-
nient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies. Considering these factors, the court held that because
Johnson had already submitted to personal jurisdiction with respect to
the contract claim, and because the contract and tort claims were interwo-
ven, these factors weighed in favor of the assumption of jurisdiction over
Johnson.30
B. CHOICE OF LAW
With franchise relationships extending across state and international
boundaries, it is important to consider forum selection and choice of law
provisions for dispute resolution. Whether choice of law clauses are con-
27. Id.





strued narrowly or broadly can greatly change the outcome of an entire
case. Federal and Texas courts generally enforce and presume valid
choice of law provisions. The first case illustrates the construction of a
choice of law clause and how the result would be the same whether the
court enforced the clause or not. A later case discusses the effect if the
contractual choice of law provision fails.
In El Polio Loco, S.A. de C. V. v. El Pollo Loco, Inc.,31 the district court
analyzed the applicable law provided in the parties' dispute resolution
clause of their intellectual property acquisition agreement (the "Agree-
ment"). In the defendants' motion to dismiss, they urged the district
court to dismiss all the plaintiff's claims for failing to state a claim under
the applicable law. El Pollo Loco, the plaintiff, was a Mexican corpora-
tion who owned the rights in Mexico to the El Pollo Loco trademarks,
trade names, copyrights, trade secrets, trade practices, and the right to a
number of franchise and license agreements with Mexican franchisees. 32
Plaintiff agreed to transfer to defendant El Pollo Loco, Inc., a United
States corporation, all its rights to the intellectual property in exchange
for an exclusive, royalty-free license within specified Mexican territories
along with other franchise-related benefits. Although the Agreement
contained a forum selection clause designating that disputes were to be
argued in the Southern District of Texas and a choice of law clause select-
ing Mexican law to govern the disputes, the plaintiff asserted tort and
contract claims, referring only to Texas law, and that was the basis for the
defendant's motion to dismiss.33 The dispute resolution clause stated:
All disputes which may arise in connection with the performance of
this Agreement, which cannot be resolved by means of negotiation,
will be resolved by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Laredo Division. Governing laws shall be those of
Mexico. EPL-USA expressly waives any rights under the laws of the
USA which may be in conflict with this provision.34
While the defendant argued that Mexican law should govern all the
plaintiff's claims since they "arise in connection with" the Agreement, the
plaintiff argued that Texas law should apply to the contract claims with-
out any justification. In the alternative, the plaintiff contended that the
choice of law provision should be narrowly construed so that, even if the
contract claims applied Mexican law, the tort claims would apply Texas
law. The district court disagreed.35
The district court followed the United States Supreme Court's rule that
"choice of law clauses were presumptively valid, and American courts
[should] enforce such clauses in the interests of international comity and
31. El Polio Loco, S.A. de C.V. v. El Polio Loco, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Tex.
2004).
32. Id. at 987.
33. Id. at 987-88.




out of deference to the integrity and proficiency of foreign courts. 36
Moreover, Texas choice of law principles gave effect to choice of law
clauses if the law chosen by the parties had a reasonable relationship with
the parties and the chosen state, and the law of the chosen state was not
contrary to the state's fundamental policy. Therefore, the district court
held that the choice of law clause was valid. 37
Although the clause was held valid and plainly governed the contract
claims, the district court noted that it was not equally clear whether the
clause applied to the tort claims. The district court considered the con-
struction of choice of law provisions in a few Fifth Circuit cases. In
Benchmark Electronics, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp.,38 the Fifth Circuit nar-
rowly construed a choice of law provision to apply only to contract claims
and not to the tort claims because the clause stated that the "[a]greement
shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the internal laws
of New York." Likewise, in Caton v. Leach Corp.,39 the Fifth Circuit did
not apply the choice of law to the alleged tort claims when the clause
stated that the "[a]greement shall be construed under the laws of the
State of California." The district court recognized, however, that the
phrase "all disputes which may arise in connection with the performance
of this Agreement" was broader than the choice of law provisions at issue
in Benchmark or Caton. The district court held that the choice of law
clause applied to the plaintiff's tort claims as well as its contract claims.40
The district court went further to show that, even if the choice of law
clause did not apply to the tort claims, the application of Texas choice of
law rules would produce the same result-Mexican law would govern the
tort claims. Texas courts use the Restatement's "most significant rela-
tionship" test to decide choice of law. The district court concluded that
most of the parties' actions and transactions arising from the Agreement
related directly to Mexico. The parties, as the district court noted, had
very minimal ties to Texas. Therefore, application of the "most signifi-
cant relationship" test required that Mexican law govern the plaintiff's
tort claims.41
Just as the district court in El Pollo Loco reasoned that the choice of
law clause must have a reasonable relationship with the parties and cho-
sen state, the Dallas Court of Appeals in SAVA Gumarska In Kemijska
Industrial D.D. v. Advanced Polymer Sciences, Inc.42 applied the same
theory. Nevertheless, the result was completely different. In SAVA,
SAVA and APS entered into two agreements-the company formation
agreement and the equipment agreement-providing for the formation
and ownership of SAVA AP, a new Slovenian stock company. After mu-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 988-89.
38. 343 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2003).
39. 896 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1990).
40. Id. at 942-43.
41. Id. at 943.
42. 128 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
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tual problems with various aspects of the transaction and SAVA AP be-
coming insolvent, APS filed claims against SAVA for breach of the
equipment agreement, in which SAVA counterclaimed for breach of the
equipment agreement, company formation agreement, and agreements
between SAVA AP and APS. The appellate court analyzed which law to
apply to the transactions at issue in this case.43
Although the equipment agreement provided that the laws of England
would apply to any disputes, English law had no relation to this transac-
tion and neither the trial nor appellate court would apply such law. Be-
cause the choice of law clause did not bear a "reasonable relationship" to
the chosen state and therefore failed, the appellate court affirmed that
Texas would apply the law of the state or nation with the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties. As a result, the court
applied Texas law to all the issues presented. 4 4
C. FORUM SELECTION
Although not specifically related to "franchise" law, the Texas Su-
preme Court last year confirmed the enforceability of forum selection
clauses, an issue important to franchises and dealerships. In In re AIU
Insurance Co.,4 5 the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the enforceability of
forum selection clauses based on Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.4 6 and
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute4 7 precedents. This was the first time
the Texas Supreme Court addressed the validity of this type of forum-
selection clause, while dealing with issues of convenience, Texas statutory
provisions, and the "public interest" of litigating in Texas.48
Louis Dreyfus Corporation obtained $70 million of pollution liability
coverage for itself and its subsidiaries from AIU Insurance Company. At
the time the policy was issued, AIU was a New York corporation with its
principal place of business in New York. The insurance policy contained
a forum-selection clause in which the insured and insurer agreed that all
disputes would be resolved in the State of New York. Louis Dreyfus Cor-
poration's subsidiary, Louis Dreyfus Natural Gas Corporation
("LDNGC"), was listed as an insured on the AIU policy. A few months
after the policy issued, LDNGC merged with American Exploration
Company, which was based in Hidalgo County, Texas. About a year and
a half after the policy became effective, LDNGC was added as a defen-
dant in a suit in Hidalgo County in which the plaintiff alleged that
LDNGC had contaminated the air, soil, and ground water. AIU pro-
vided a defense under a reservation of rights and disputed coverage.
LDNGC sued AIU in Hidalgo County seeking a declaratory judgment
43. Id. at 310-13.
44. Id. at 314.
45. 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004).
46. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
47. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
48. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 109.
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that the environmental contamination claims against it were covered.
AIU filed a motion to dismiss based on the insurance policy's forum-se-
lection clause. The Hidalgo County trial court denied AIU's motion to
dismiss, and the court of appeals denied mandamus relief. The Texas Su-
preme Court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandamus. 49
At one time, American courts disfavored forum-selection clauses be-
cause such clauses were viewed as "ousting" a court of jurisdiction. In
1972, however, the United States Supreme Court held in Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. that international forum-selection clauses should
be given full effect, absent fraud, undue influence, or overwhelming bar-
gaining power.50 Subsequently, in Carnival Cruise, Inc. v. Shute, the U.S.
Supreme Court enforced a clause that selected Florida as the situs of any
litigation when the plaintiff sued in the state of Washington. 51 Moreover,
the Texas Supreme Court noted that since these two U.S. Supreme Court
cases, five Texas appellate courts have enforced forum-selection clauses
that provided that litigation must be brought in a particular state.52
LDNGC urged the supreme court that the Bremen exceptions applied
to a forum-selection clause (1) upon a "strong showing" or (2) a showing
that the enforcement would be unreasonable and unjustly applied in the
instant case. Specifically, LDNGC gave three reasons why the supreme
court should set aside the forum-selection clause. First, LDNGC con-
tended that many, if not most, potential witnesses regarding coverage is-
sues were in Texas. Second, Texas Insurance Code Article 21.42 applied
and required that Texas law govern. Finally, LDNGC argued that Texas
had a strong public interest in having the coverage issues litigated in
Texas because insurance proceeds "could be used to benefit the health
and welfare of the citizens and landowners of Hidalgo County, Texas,"
and the substantial amount of insurance available under the policy "is
also likely to dissipate any potential adverse financial effects on"
LDNGC's successor, who had its offices in Houston and employed a
large number of people in Texas. The supreme court rejected all three
arguments. 53
On LDNGC's inconvenience argument, the supreme court analyzed
whether LDNGC had established that trial in the contractual forum
would be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that LDNGC would, for
all practical purposes, be deprived of its day in court. The supreme court
held that LDNGC did not show how litigating in New York would essen-
49. Id. at 110-12.
50. Breman, 407 U.S. at 1.
51. Shute, 499 U.S. at 585.
52. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 109. The five Texas cases include: My Caf6-CCC,
Ltd. v. Lunchstop, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 860, 865-867 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.); CMS
Partners, Ltd. v. Plumrose USA, Inc., 101 S.W.3d 730, 734-736 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2003, no pet.); Holeman v. Nat'l Bus. Inst., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 101-103 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 203-
205 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied); Abacan Tech. Servs. Ltd. v. Global Marine
Int'l Servs. Corp., 994 S.W.2d 839, 843-845 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
53. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 112-13.
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
tially deprive it of its day in court. Furthermore, the supreme court noted
how the U.S. Supreme Court refined its analysis of Bremen in Carnival
Cruise Lines. In Carnival Cruise Lines, a passenger sued Carnival Cruise
Lines after she sustained personal injuries on the cruise. Although her
printed tickets contained a forum-selection clause for any litigation to be
brought in Florida, the passenger sued in the State of Washington. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that Florida was not a "remote alien forum,"
nor was there any indication that Carnival Cruise Lines set Florida as the
forum as a means of discouraging cruise passengers from pursuing legiti-
mate claims. The Texas Supreme Court analogously held that New York
was not a remote alien forum and there was no indication that AIU or
LDNGC chose New York as a means of discouraging claims. The su-
preme court further held that there was no evidence of fraud or
overreaching. 54
After noting that the Texas Insurance Code did not require the suit to
be brought or maintained in Texas, the supreme court firmly rejected
LDNGC's argument that the insurance proceeds would benefit Texas
businesses. The supreme court held that "not only does this reflect some-
thing of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals, a
notion rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bremen, LDNGC's argu-
ment blatantly suggests that the tribunal should consider, consciously or
unconsciously, the benefits to the local community in deciding whether
there is insurance coverage. '55 The supreme court held that this argu-
ment was highly offensive to a system of justice based on the rule of law
and gave fodder to those who have in the past questioned the fairness of
Texas courts. The supreme court "categorically" rejected this
argument.56
In addition to arguing that the forum-selection clause should be set
aside, LDNGC presented several reasons why mandamus relief was un-
available. First, LDNGC contended that AIU had an adequate remedy
at law. The supreme court reasoned that it had granted mandamus relief
to enforce another type of forum-selection clause-an arbitration agree-
ment-which should be analyzed in the same manner. LDNGC argued
that the supreme court should treat a forum-selection clause requiring
litigation to be brought in another state different from arbitration agree-
ments; it argued that (1) requiring the parties to proceed to trial in Texas
and then enforcing the forum-selection clause on appeal did not make an
appellate remedy inadequate, and (2) AIU might prevail in a trial in
Texas and that the mere possibility of a waste of judicial resources if AIU
did not prevail would not render an appellate remedy inadequate. Nev-
ertheless, the supreme court rejected both of these arguments and con-
cluded that an appeal following a trial would be an inadequate remedy. 57
54. Id. at 113-114.
55. Id. at 114.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 115 (noting that the supreme court stated that these same considerations
were presented in Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, where the supreme court similarly held
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The supreme court also noted that subjecting a party to trial in a forum
other than that agreed upon and requiring an appeal to vindicate the
rights granted in a forum-selection clause was "clear harassment" with no
benefit to either the individual case or the judicial system as a whole.58
The AIU court held that only the breaching party benefits from the
breach of a forum selection clause; that party hopes that its adversary will
weary or avoid the cost of protracted litigation and settle when the adver-
sary would not otherwise have done so. Furthermore, the supreme court
held that by insisting that the case proceed in a forum other than that
agreed upon, the breaching party would be adding a layer of expense that
would otherwise not exist, and the breaching party may be inclined to
protract proceedings to encourage a favorable settlement. Consequently,
the supreme court concluded that a trial in a forum other than that con-
tractually agreed upon would be a meaningless waste of judicial re-
sources, the error would not be harmless, and the forum-selection clause
was enforceable by mandamus. 59
D. ARBITRATION
Parties often contract to resolve any future disputes through arbitra-
tion. In Beyond the Arches, a McDonald's franchisee petitioned the
Beaumont Court of Appeals for mandamus relief to enforce an arbitra-
tion agreement with its employee.60 The franchisee's employee sued for
negligence when she injured her back at work. The franchisee filed a
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a dispute resolution agreement
that the employee allegedly signed. The appellate court reasoned that a
party seeking to compel arbitration must first establish that an arbitration
agreement exists. The appellate court held that the franchisee did not
meet its burden of establishing a "meeting of the minds," consent to the
terms, and acceptance of the terms in strict compliance with the arbitra-
tion agreement terms. The franchisee argued that at the time of employ-
ment, all employees were given a copy of the dispute resolution program,
and it maintained that the employee could not have signed the form with-
out being presented with a copy of the program. The franchisee, how-
ever, did not present evidence that the employee in fact signed the
form.
6 1
Furthermore, the appellate court held that the employee did not ratify
the arbitration agreement by accepting the franchisee's benefits or by al-
lowing the franchisee to pay the medical expenses. The appellate court
reasoned that, before the acceptance of benefits could be said to trigger
estoppel or demonstrate ratification, it must be shown that the benefits
that an appeal based on an arbitration clause following a trial would be an inadequate
remedy). See Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272-273 (Tex. 1992).
58. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 117.
59. Id. at 118.
60. In re Beyond the Arches, Inc., No. 09-04-126 CV, 2004 WL 1699900 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont Jul. 29, 2004, no pet. h.).
61. Id. at *1-3.
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were accepted with knowledge of all material facts. Here, the employee
did not accept the employer's payment of her work-related accident ben-
efits in recognition of the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the peti-
tion for writ of mandamus was denied. 62
In In re Wood, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether an arbi-
trator or a court should rule on class certification issues when the con-
tracts at issue committed all disputes arising out of the agreement to the
arbitrator.63 The supreme court held that such authority resided with the
arbitrator. Two days before the appellate court directed the trial court to
determine whether to certify the class, the United States Supreme Court
held that "where parties agreed to submit all disputes to an arbitrator
under the Federal Arbitration Act, issues of class arbitration are for the
arbitrator to decide." 64 Contrary to the appellate court's decision that
Green Tree65 was inapplicable, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that
Green Tree was directly on point. 66
In Green Tree, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to interpret the con-
tract and rule whether the contract itself expressly allowed or forbade
class arbitration. Instead, the Supreme Court held that, as a question of
contract interpretation, the issue of class arbitrability had been commit-
ted to the arbitrator because the dispute related to the contract. The Su-
preme Court concluded that the parties agreed to have an arbitrator, not
a judge, answer the relevant question. Likewise, the Wood court held
that an arbitrator should decide whether to certify this class because the
underlying suit was based on contracts with arbitration clauses that each
of the over 2,000 plaintiffs entered into with the defendant. 67
The Texas Supreme Court also rejected the defendant's attempt to es-
cape Green Tree's application by arguing that the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"), at the time this lawsuit was filed, did not have
rules for class arbitration similar to the rules the Federal Arbitration Act
provided. Since the lawsuit was filed, the AAA had published such rules.
The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument that the rule could
not be effective because it was not in effect when the lawsuit was filed,
the date when the trial court referred the case to arbitration, or the date
arbitration was initiated. The supreme court held that another plausible
interpretation of the "rules in effect" language was the rules in effect
when the arbitration actually began. Therefore, the supreme court main-
tained that the appellate court erred in directing the trial court to deter-
mine class certification since such authority lay with the arbitrator. 68
62. Id. at *4-5.
63. In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2004).
64. Green Tree Fin. Co. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-52 (2003).
65. Id.
66. In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d at 369.
67. Id. at 368.
68. Id. at 369.
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E. JURY WAIVER PROVISIONS
Personal, constitutional rights, such as trial by jury, access to the courts,
and due process of law, have often been argued to be non-waivable. Dur-
ing the Survey period, however, the Texas Supreme Court determined
whether a pre-suit waiver of trial by jury was enforceable and fit for man-
damus review, an issue of first impression for the court. The supreme
court held that (1) jury waivers, in general, were enforceable; (2) the spe-
cific waiver in the instant case was enforceable; and (3) the enforceability
of a jury waiver was appropriate for mandamus review.69
In In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Francesco and Jane
Secchi and their limited partnership (collectively, the "Secchis") owned
and operated two Dallas restaurants and had recently executed a lease to
open a third restaurant. 70 In connection with the lease, the Secchis per-
sonally guaranteed the lease as Prudential insisted. The Secchis sued Pru-
dential Insurance Company of America, claiming, in part, that it was
impossible to do business on the premises because of a persistent sewage
odor. When the trial court notified the parties that a date for a non-jury
trial had been set, the Secchis filed a jury demand that the trial court
subsequently granted. Although the Secchis paid the required fee ac-
cording to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 216, Prudential moved to quash
the jury demand based on the jury waiver in the lease. Specifically, the
lease language stated that, "Tenant and Landlord both waive a trial by
jury of any or all issues arising in any action or proceeding between the
parties hereto or their successors, under or connected with this Lease, or
any of its provisions." The Secchis responded and alleged that contrac-
tual jury waivers in general, and the waiver in the lease in particular, were
unenforceable. The supreme court addressed each of the arguments the
Secchis asserted and rejected all of them. 71
First, the supreme court addressed whether contractual jury waivers in
general were enforceable. The supreme court reasoned that personal
rights provided in the Texas Constitution could be waived, at least under
certain conditions. Furthermore, the Secchis' argument that Rule 216
prescribes the only way in which a trial by jury can be waived was com-
pletely rejected. The supreme court held that the Rule's express lan-
guage contained prerequisites to a jury trial, not guarantees of one. Also,
the supreme court considered the Secchis' argument that an agreement to
waive trial by jury was contrary to public policy because to allow such
waivers gave parties the power to alter the fundamental nature of the
civil justice system by private agreement. The supreme court rejected this
argument.72
The supreme court reasoned that parties already have power to agree
to important aspects of how prospective disputes will be resolved, such
69. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004).
70. Id. at 127.
71. Id. at 124, 127-29.
72. Id. at 130-31.
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that they can decide that the law of a certain jurisdiction will apply, desig-
nate the forum in which future litigation will be conducted, and waive in
personam jurisdiction. Most contrary to the Secchis' argument is that
parties can agree to opt out of the civil justice system altogether and sub-
mit future disputes to arbitration. Therefore, the supreme court denied
the Secchis' public policy argument because public policy that permits
parties to waive trial altogether surely does not forbid waiver of trial by
jury.73
When analyzing whether the jury waiver was enforceable in general,
the supreme court noted the fundamental principle that a waiver of con-
stitutional rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent with full
awareness of the legal consequences. Moreover, the supreme court noted
that if parties were willing to agree to a non-jury trial, it was preferable to
enforce that agreement rather than leave them with arbitration as their
only enforceable option. By agreeing to arbitration, parties waived not
only their right to trial by jury but also their right to appeal, whereas by
agreeing to waive only the former right, they took advantage of the re-
duced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoided the expense of arbitra-
tion, and retained their right to appeal.
74
Second, the supreme court then applied this general law to the specific
facts of this case. The supreme court initially held that Secchis' conten-
tion that the waiver was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent was un-
founded. To start with, the waiver's language was crystal clear; although
it was near the end of a lengthy document, it was not printed in small type
or hidden in lengthy text. Next, although the caption "jury waiver" in-
stead of "jury trial" might have been clearer, the supreme court did not
agree that the caption would have reasonably diverted the Secchis' atten-
tion or misled them into thinking that the provision meant the opposite of
what it clearly said. Also, as with most contract responsibilities, the
Secchis were charged with knowledge of all of the lease provisions even
though they did not read the "jury trial" paragraph.75
Finally, the supreme court held that the jury waiver was enforceable
even if Prudential allegedly fraudulently induced the Secchis to enter into
the lease. To hold otherwise would entirely defeat the purpose of such
jury waiver and related provisions-to control resolution of future
disputes. 76
Lastly, the Secchis argued that because the guaranty did not contain a
waiver, the waiver could not be enforced against them. The supreme
court disagreed. The supreme court held that the guaranty incorporated
by reference the jury waiver in the lease because the guaranty "plainly
[referred] to another writing. '77
73. Id. at 131.
74. Id. at 132.
75. Id. at 133-34.
76. Id. at 133-35.
77. Id. at 135.
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After holding that the jury waiver was enforceable, the supreme court
considered, as it did in In re AIU Ins. Co., whether mandamus relief was
proper. All of the above analysis only established that the first prong was
met-whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion. The second
prong-whether the relator has shown that it had no adequate remedy by
appeal-similarly required detailed analysis. The principle behind man-
damus review is that it may be essential to preserve important substantive
and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts
to give needed and helpful discretion to the law that would otherwise
prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties
and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual re-
versal of improperly conducted proceedings. The supreme court held
that if Prudential were to obtain judgment on a favorable jury verdict, it
could not appeal, and its contractual right would be lost forever. On the
other hand, if Prudential suffered judgment on an unfavorable verdict,
Prudential could not obtain reversal for the incorrect denial of its con-
tractual right "unless the court of appeals concludes that the error com-
plained of ... probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. ' ' 78
Accordingly, the supreme court held that to deny Prudential enforcement
of the jury waiver by mandamus was to deny it any remedy at all; the
supreme court granted mandamus relief.79
F. REMOVAL
In Kardell v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., defendants Century Real
Estate Corporation ("Century 21") and Lowery Nabb filed a joint notice
of removal on June 14, 2004. The plaintiff, Patricia Kardell, opposed and
filed a motion to remand to state court claiming that there was no diver-
sity jurisdiction as a result of the joinder of Texas resident Nabb as a
defendant. 80
The underlying facts show that Kardell entered into a franchise agree-
ment with Century 21 in 1999. In 2002, Kardell attempted to sell her real
property and her Century 21 franchise to Stephen B. Hill, subject to the
franchise agreement's provision that the franchisee had to obtain the
franchisor's consent, which could not be unreasonably withheld. Follow-
ing her agreement with Hill, Kardell informed Nabb, Century 21's re-
gional service director, of the impending franchise sale. In September
2002, Nabb informed Kardell that he could not assist her with the assign-
ment and that she would instead have to work it out with the Century 21
managers. The franchise agreement that Century 21 subsequently pre-
pared required Hill to accept a ten-year franchise agreement rather than
the two years remaining on the agreement with Kardell. As a result of
this condition, Hill refused to purchase Kardell's business. Kardell then
78. Id. at 139-40.
79. Id.
80. Kardell v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., No. SA-04-CA-510-RF, 2004 WL
2550591, at *1-2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2004).
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sued Century 21 and Nabb for breach of contract and tortious interfer-
ence with an existing contract. 81
The district court analyzed whether Nabb was improperly joined to de-
feat diversity jurisdiction to decide whether the defendants were entitled
to maintain the action in federal court. While suits arising under federal
law are removable irrespective of the citizenship of the parties, all other
suits are removable "only if none of the parties in interest properly joined
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought."'82 In this case, Nabb was a Texas resident; the defendants,
therefore, had the heavy burden of proving that Nabb had been improp-
erly joined to defeat remand to state court.
The district court held that there were two ways to establish improper
joinder: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) in-
ability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-di-
verse party in state court. Fraudulent or improper joinder will be
established if proven that there is no reasonable basis for predicting that
the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant. To
prove whether a reasonable basis for recovery exists, the court has two
ways to resolve this issue: (1) the court can conduct a Rule 12(b)(6)-type
analysis or (2) the court can pierce the pleadings and conduct a summary
inquiry-an approach appropriate only when a plaintiff has stated a claim
but has misstated or omitted discrete facts that would determine the pro-
priety of joinder. The defendants did not meet their burden.83
After analyzing the elements of tortious interference with an existing
contract (since this was the only claim alleged against Nabb), the district
court held that because there was a possibility that Kardell had set forth a
valid cause of action against Nabb, the case was remanded to state
court.
8 4
IV. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION AND
NON-RENEWAL
A. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
While there are a number of state and federal laws that specifically
regulate the franchisee-franchisor relationship, Shell Oil Co. v. HRN, Inc.
demonstrates that the unique nature of the franchisee-franchisor relation-
ship does not preclude application of traditional commercial laws, such as
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). 85
In Shell Oil Co. v. HRN, Inc., several hundred Shell dealers who leased
Shell service stations and purchased gasoline from Shell under dealer
agreements (the "Dealers") filed suit against Shell alleging that Shell vio-
lated UCC section 2-305(2) based on the manner in which Shell set the
81. Id.
82. Id. at *1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2002)) (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id. at *3.
85. Shell Oil Co. v. HRN, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2004).
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prices the Dealers paid for Shell gasoline.86 The Dealers alleged that
Shell set prices arbitrarily high in order to drive the Dealers out of busi-
ness. Shell argued that the Dealers' claims failed as a matter of law be-
cause there was evidence that Shell's Dealer price was commercially
reasonable, regardless of the effect that the price may have had on the
Dealers' profit margins.87
In order to evaluate the Dealers' claims, the Texas Supreme Court felt
it was necessary to understand Shell's gasoline distribution network.
Shell distributed gasoline through three classes of trade: (1) through the
Dealers who operated as Shell franchisees, (2) through Shell company-
owned stores, and (3) through "Jobbers" who purchased gasoline from
Shell and sold that gasoline to either Dealers or independent service sta-
tions.88 The price Shell charged depended on what class of trade the pur-
chaser participated in. Dealers paid the dealer tank-wagon price
("DTW"), while Jobbers paid an off-the-rack price ("OTR"), which was
lower than the DTW price. Moreover, if a Jobber purchased gasoline at
the OTR price and then sold that gasoline to a Dealer, the Jobber was
retroactively charged the DTW price. The Dealers claimed that Shell set
the DTW price higher than the OTR price in bad faith to drive the Deal-
ers out of business, and convert the Dealers' stores into more profitable
Shell company owned stores. 89
The Texas Supreme Court analyzed the Dealers' claims under the
UCC. The Dealer contracts were open price term contracts, and under
section 2-305(b) of the UCC, the seller may set the price to be charged
under an open price term contract, but must do so in good faith.90 The
supreme court held that good faith under 2-305 meant a commercially
reasonable and non-discriminatory price.91 A commercially reasonable
price was one that was within the range of prices charged by other partici-
pants in the market. 92 Further, a non-discriminatory price was one that
was applied equally to similarly situated purchasers-the same members
of a class of trade in a particular market. 93
Applying these standards to the Dealers, the supreme court held that
Shell did not breach the UCC's duty of good faith.94 The court noted that
Shell did not discriminate among Dealers in a particular market, and that
Shell's price was within the range of DTW prices charged by other refin-
ers.95 The fact that the DTW price was higher than the OTR price did
not persuade the court that Shell had acted in bad faith. The court stated
that "[w]e cannot agree that a relatively high, yet commercially reasona-
86. Id. at 431.
87. Id. at 432.
88. Id. at 431.
89. Id. at 432.
90. Id. at 432-33.
91. Id. at 433.
92. Id. at 434.
93. Id. at 436.




ble, price is evidence of bad faith. A good-faith price under section 2-305
is not synonymous with a fair market price or the lowest price availa-
ble."' 96 As a result, the Texas Supreme Court rendered judgment in favor
of Shell.
Also of note is the supreme court's rejection of the Dealers' argument
that the fact that the Dealers were required to purchase only Shell gaso-
line was relevant to the determination that Shell had acted in bad faith.
The supreme court stated that the Dealers were only "captive" buyers of
Shell products as a result of their own decision to become Shell-branded
franchisees. 97 Therefore, the "captivity" the Dealers complained of was
the "normal case" of a long-term franchisee and was not relevant to de-
termining whether Shell acted in bad faith in setting the price of
gasoline.98
B. THE FAILURE TO PERFORM
The court in Hildreth v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc.99 construed a
franchise agreement as a matter of law in order to determine that the
franchisee failed to perform under the franchise agreement, and there-
fore, could not maintain a cause of action for breach of contract against
the franchisor.
Hildreth operated a Merle Norman franchise. 100 She successfully oper-
ated the franchise for several years when her landlord sold the building
where the franchise was located, which required Hildreth to relocate her
franchise. Before she could relocate the franchise, however, she had to
obtain written approval from the franchisor. Hildreth requested ap-
proval, and Merle Norman orally agreed to provide written approval to
relocate as soon as Hildreth brought her account with Merle Norman cur-
rent.10 1 Hildreth purportedly mailed payment to Merle Norman's corpo-
rate office on three separate occasions, but payment was never received.
Therefore, Merle Norman never provided the written approval to relo-
cate. As a result, Hildreth was forced to close her franchise. Hildreth
then sued Merle Norman alleging that it breached the franchise agree-
ment and the duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide
written consent to relocate.10 2
In order to assert a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the existence of a valid contract, (2) performance or tendered per-
formance by the plaintiff, (3) breach of the contract by the defendant,
and (4) damages resulting from the breach.10 3 The court focused on
96. Id.
97. Id. at 438.
98. Id.
99. Hildreth v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., No. 08-02-00402-CV, 2004 WL 736991
(Tex. App.-El Paso Apr. 6, 2004, no pet. h.).
100. Id. at *1.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *2.
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whether Hildreth performed under the franchise agreement.
Under the franchise agreement, Hildreth was required to operate the
franchise in a businesslike manner while keeping the store open "at all
hours regularly kept by other retail establishments in [her] neighborhood
or area . . ."104 Despite this obligation, Hildreth only opened her store
for one day a week. Thus, the court had to determine whether keeping
the store open for only one day per week constituted performance that
enabled Hildreth to satisfy a material element of her breach of contract
claim.
The court applied the traditional rules of contract construction and
held that the franchise agreement unambiguously defined the franchisee's
performance obligations and required Hildreth to keep her store open for
five days per week-the same number of days that other retail establish-
ments in her neighborhood remained open.105 Because Hildreth had not
kept her store open five days per week, the court of appeals held that she
had not substantially performed her obligations under the franchise
agreement. As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the summary judg-
ment in favor of Merle Norman because Hildreth could not prove that
she had substantially performed her obligations under the franchise
agreement.106
An interesting facet of the court of appeal's analysis is that by focusing
on whether Hildreth performed by keeping her store open for the same
number of days as other stores in her neighborhood, the court was able to
side-step the issue of whether mailing the payment to Merle Norman con-
stituted tendering performance, which presumably would have entitled
Hildreth to obtain written approval to relocate.
C. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
Although Texas does not have statutory franchise relationship laws,
there are other federal statutes, in addition to the Franchise Rule dis-
cussed earlier, that impact certain types of franchisee-franchisor relation-
ships. One example is the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (the
"PMPA"), which governs the termination and non-renewal of petroleum
franchise relationships. 10 7 In Sun Chase Enterprises, Inc. v. Swati Enter-
prises, Inc.,108 the court held that the PMPA does not govern all aspects
of a petroleum franchise relationship, and therefore, did not preempt a
cause of action for tortious interference with a prospective contract to
purchase petroleum products from suppliers other than the franchisor.
Sun Chase Enterprises, Inc. ("SCE") operated several gas stations
under a franchise agreement with the defendant Swati Enterprises, Inc.
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *4.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000).
108. 143 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.).
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("Swati"). 10 9 The franchise agreement obligated SCE to brand its stores
as Chevron stations and sell only Chevron products, but SCE was permit-
ted to purchase those products from suppliers other than Swati." 0 At
some point, the business relationship between SCE and Swati became
acrimonious, and SCE attempted to purchase Chevron products from
suppliers other than Swati. 111 In response, Swati sent letters to those sup-
pliers stating that Swati had a contractual agreement with SCE, and
would take all appropriate legal action to protect Swati's rights under that
agreement. Eventually, Swati terminated the franchise agreements, and
SCE filed suit for tortious interference with a prospective business rela-
tionship but did not make a claim for wrongful termination or non-re-
newal of the franchise agreement. Swati argued that the PMPA
preempted SCE's state law tort claims and moved to dismiss the case.112
The court of appeals noted that federal courts take two approaches in
interpreting the PMPA. Some courts take a restrictive view and hold that
the PMPA only preempts state laws that regulate the grounds and proce-
dures regarding termination of a petroleum franchise and the notification
requirements for termination. 1 3 On the other hand, some federal courts
take an expansive view of the PMPA and hold that the PMPA preempts
any state law action that arises out of, or is incident to, the termination of
a petroleum franchise.114
Ultimately, the court held that the PMPA did not preempt SCE's tor-
tious interference claims under either view because those claims related
to Swati's attempts to "protect" his contractual relationship rather than
Swati's termination of the franchise agreements. "We hold only that a
state law claim for tortious interference with prospective business rela-
tions is not preempted by the PMPA where the state law claim is not an
incident of the termination or non-renewal of the franchise.""H5
V. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER
PROTECION Acr
In round two of Texas Taco Cabana L.P. v. Taco Cabana of New Mex-
ico, Inc.," 6 the court considered cross motions for summary judgment.
Franchisees filed a counter-claim alleging that franchisors committed un-
109. Id. at 903.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 904.
112. Id. at 904-05.
113. Id. at 905.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 906.
116. Tex. Taco Cabana L.P. v. Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc., No. Civ. A. SA-02-CV-1209,
2004 WL 2106527, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2004). For round one, see Tex. Taco Cabana
L.P. v. Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (explaining
the court's rulings on motion to dismiss). For a through discussion of round one, see
Deborah S. Coldwell et al., Franchise Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 1055-57 (2004).
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fair and unconscionable acts in violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA").117 In the DTPA claim,
the franchisees alleged that the franchisors refused to cooperate in devel-
opment under an amendment to one of their franchise agreements,
falsely claimed that a development agreement did not exist, refused to
acknowledge franchisees' continuing development rights, defaulted under
a license agreement and threatened to terminate a license agreement. 118
The court disagreed, however, and held that a disagreement over the in-
terpretation of a contract was not actionable under the DTPA.a1 9 There-
fore, franchisors were not liable under the DTPA for refusing to
cooperate in the development of additional Taco Cabanas or for allegedly
being in default under their agreements. 120 These issues only dealt with
contractual interpretation and did not support claims under the DTPA. 121
The franchisees' claim that the franchisors acted unconscionably by
falsely claiming that a development agreement did not exist also failed. 122
The court agreed that "false statements of fact regarding a party's rights
under an agreement are sufficient to support a violation of the DTPA."'1 23
According to the court, however, the franchisees failed to provide any
evidence that franchisors actually denied the existence of the develop-
ment agreement other than in their initial complaint. The franchisors
later amended the complaint and admitted the existence of the develop-
ment agreement. The franchisees also failed to allege any damages that
could have arisen from the franchisors' denial of the existence of the de-
velopment agreement.1 24 The court granted the franchisors' motion for
summary judgment on the franchisees' counter-claim.1 25
In Carousel's Creamery, LLC v. Marble Slab Creamery, Inc.,126 fran-
chisee Carousel's Creamery ("Carousel's Creamery") sued franchisor
Marble Slab ("Marble Slab") for violations of the DTPA, negligent mis-
representation, and fraud. Marble Slab filed a counterclaim alleging
breach of contract.
After a jury trial, the court granted Marble Slab's motion for directed
verdict on the negligent misrepresentation claim, but denied the motion
on the fraud and DTPA claims.' 27 To prevail on its DTPA claim, Carou-
sel's Creamery was required to prove that "(1) Carousel's Creamery was
a consumer of Marble Slab's goods or services; (2) Marble Slab commit-
117. Tex. Taco Cabana, 2004 WL 2106527, at *1.
118. Id. at *9.
119. Id. (citing Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d
591, 596 (Tex. 1992); Enter-Laredo Assoc. v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 828-29 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied)).
120. Tex. Taco Cabana, 2004 WL 2106527, at *9.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Leal v. Furniture Barns, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1978)).
124. Id.
125. Id.




ted one of the false, misleading or deceptive acts enumerated under sec-
tion 17.46(b) of the DTPA, breached an express or implied warranty, or
engaged in an unconscionable action or course of action; and (3) these
acts were the producing cause of Carousel's Creamery's actual dam-
ages."' 128 To satisfy the producing cause requirement of the third factor,
Carousel's Creamery needed to show that the acts were both a cause-in-
fact and a "substantial factor" in causing the injuries. 129 At the trial court
level, the jury found in favor of the franchisor and against Carousel's
Creamery on its fraud and DTPA claims. 130 The appellate court found
that there was substantial evidence to support the finding that Marble
Slab's representations were neither a cause-in-fact nor a "substantial fac-
tor" in causing Carousel's Creamery's injuries, and therefore, Carousel's
Creamery was unable to recover on its DTPA and fraud claims.
131
VI. COMMON-LAW CLAIMS
A. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
Plaintiffs have increasingly begun to assert both contract and fraud
causes of action in order to recover punitive damages that are often sig-
nificantly greater than the benefit-of-the-bargain damages available
under a pure contract claim. The tendency to assert each of the above
causes of action has given rise to the law of "contorts." Although a fun-
damental difference exists between the law of contracts and the law of
torts, Texas courts have struggled to enunciate a bright line distinction
between the two. As the Texas Supreme Court stated, "courts and com-
mentators have struggled to clarify the boundary between contract claims
and other causes of action. '1 32
In one of the watershed opinions in this area of the law, the Texas Su-
preme Court, in Haase v. Glazner,133 held that a plaintiff could not assert
a fraudulent inducement claim in the absence of a contract and, to the
extent a plaintiff sought to recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages re-
lated to a contract that was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
the Statute barred the fraud claim.134 The Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals in Houston recently revisited this issue in McMillan v. Interna-
tional Brands, Ltd. The court held that the plaintiff could not recover
benefit-of-the bargain damages because the alleged contract to purchase
a distributorship was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 135
128. Id. at 399 (citing Brown v. Bank of Galveston, Nat. Ass'n, 963 S.W.2d 511, 513
(Tex. 1998)).
129. Id. (citing Brown, 963 S.W.2d at 514).
130. Id. at 390.
131. Id. at 402-03.
132. Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. 1996) (citing William Powers,
Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1994)).
133. 62 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. 2001).
134. Id.
135. McMillan v. Hillman Int'l Brands, Ltd., No. 14-03-01392-CV, 2004 WL 1660760, at
*1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 27, 2004, pet. denied).
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In McMillan, William J. McMillan ("McMillan"), an employee of Hill-
man International Brands, Ltd. ("Hillman"), approached Hillman execu-
tives about the possibility of buying Hillman and maintaining its
distributorship business with its current employees. After several weeks
of discussions, McMillan, Hillman's chief executive officer, and other
Hillman executives signed a letter directed to Hillman employees stating
that Hillman would be sold to McMillan. For undisclosed reasons, how-
ever, the sale of Hillman to McMillan was never consummated. 136 When
Hillman was eventually sold to a third party for the sum of $38.5 million,
McMillan filed suit alleging that Hillman representatives made fraudulent
representations regarding their intent to sell Hillman to McMillan and
that the letter constituted a valid contract for sale under the Statute of
Frauds.
The court rejected both of McMillan's arguments and upheld the trial
court's judgment for Hillman on all counts.137 After examining the evi-
dence, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the letter was
nothing more than an agreement to negotiate. 138 More specifically, the
court of appeals held that because the letter failed to define the property
and assets being sold and failed to specify the price to be paid, the letter
lacked material terms, and therefore, was not an enforceable contract
under the Statute of Frauds. As a result, McMillan was not entitled to
benefit-of-the-bargain damages. Relying on Haase v. Glazner, the court
held that, in the absence of an enforceable contract, a plaintiff's claims
cannot survive summary judgment when benefit-of-the-bargain damages
are sought. 139
Furthermore, because the court of appeals characterized the letter as a
future promise to negotiate the sale of the distributorship to McMillan,
the court held that the letter could not form the basis of a cause of action
for fraud in the absence of any evidence that the future "promise" was
made with the intent to deceive and with no intent to perform. Because
McMillan failed to introduce any evidence that Hillman representatives
did not intend to sell Hillman to McMillan at the time the letter was writ-
ten, the court of appeals rejected McMillan's fraud claim. Therefore, just
as in Haase, the court of appeals refused to allow a plaintiff to use a fraud
claim to enforce an unenforceable contract. 140
Carousel's Creamery, L.L.C. v. Marble Slab Creamery, Inc.141 exempli-
fies how Texas common-law tort claims can be used to regulate
franchisors in Texas similar to how other states and the federal govern-
ment regulate franchisors by statute. Carousel's Creamery acquired sev-
eral Marble Slab Creamery franchises. After a period of operating losses,
Carousel's Creamery sued Marble Slab claiming that Marble Slab made
136. Id. at *2.




141. 134 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. granted).
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material misrepresentations in its Uniform Franchise Operating Circular
("UFOC"). 142 Specifically, Carousel's Creamery said that Marble Slab in-
tentionally used a company owned store that did not have labor costs and
that generated substantial revenue from catering corporate events, rather
than from in-store sales, as the "model store" in the UFOC "in order to
dramatically improve the financial results that could be portrayed in the
UFOC."'1 43 Carousel's Creamery alleged that by so doing, Marble Slab's
UFOC artificially inflated franchise income and profits, which led Carou-
sel's Creamery to acquire franchises that it would not have acquired had
Marble Slab fully and accurately disclosed the profitability of its
franchises. 144 As a result, Carousel's Creamery filed suit against Marble
Slab for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of the
DTPA.145
With respect to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court of ap-
peals noted that the UFOC (1) failed to state that the "model store" was
a company-owned store that had substantially lower labor and freight
costs than a typical franchise, (2) did not disclose the percent of revenue
the "model store" generated from catering services, and (3) failed to dis-
close the overall turnover rate for Marble Slab franchisees. 146 The court
held that all of this information directly affected Carousel's Creamery's
bottom line and materially influenced Carousel's Creamery's decision to
invest in the Marble Slab company. 147
Moreover, the court held that Carousel's Creamery justifiably relied on
the representations in the UFOC, notwithstanding the fact that the
franchise agreement contained a non-reliance and merger clause. 148 The
court noted that the Federal Trade Commission's rules and regulations
governing franchisor-franchisee relationships require that information in
UFOCs be truthful, accurate, and concise. 149 Further, a Marble Slab rep-
resentative testified that if information is contained in a UFOC, a fran-
chisee may rely on it.150 Therefore, the court held that Carousel's
Creamery was justified in expecting the information in the UFOC to be
accurate and not misleading.' 5 '
Because the information was misleading, and because Carousel's
Creamery was justified in relying on that information, the court of ap-
peals held that the trial court erred in granting Marble Slab a directed
verdict on Carousel's Creamery's negligent misrepresentation claim and
reversed that portion of the trial court's judgment.1 52
142. Id. at 391.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 390; see supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 391.
147. Id. at 391-92.
148. Id. at 394.
149. Id. at 391.
150. Id. at 392.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 394.
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As discussed earlier at Section V, Subsection A., the court of appeals
upheld the trial court's judgment in favor of Marble Slab on Carousel's
Creamery's fraud and DTPA claims. Although Carousel's Creamery's
fraud and DTPA claims were grounded on many of the same facts as its
negligent misrepresentation claim, the court held that there was substan-
tial evidence to support the jury's finding that Carousel's Creamery could
not establish the causation elements of its fraud and DTPA claims.
153
More specifically, the court of appeals held that there was significant
evidence to support the jury's finding that Carousel's Creamery's failure
to adequately investigate its investment decision was the cause of its inju-
ries, rather than Marble Slab's failure to make full and complete disclo-
sures in the UFOC. 154 In reaching this decision, the court relied on
testimony from franchising experts and certified public accounts who tes-
tified that it was "silly, foolish, and improper" for Carousel's Creamery to
rely only on the UFOC, fail to read the franchise agreements, fail to re-
view detailed financial statements, and fail to consult with an attorney
before investing in the Marble Slab franchise system.
155
Although the appellate court's findings appear to be inconsistent at
first glance, a closer examination reveals that they are not. The court's
analysis of Carousel's Creamery's negligent misrepresentation claim fo-
cused on whether Marble Slab violated its statutory duty to make truthful
and accurate statements in the UFOC.156 Because (1) all of the state-
ments in the UFOC were untruthful and inaccurate and (2) Marble Slab
had a statutory duty to make truthful and accurate disclosures, the court
of appeals held that Carousel's Creamery presented a viable claim for
negligent misrepresentation. 157
On the other hand, Carousel's Creamery's fraud and DTPA claims es-
sentially alleged that Marble Slab's misstatements in its UFOC were the
cause of all of Carousel's Creamery's financial difficulties. The court of
appeals, however, held that it was Carousel's Creamery's failure to inves-
tigate its investment decision and its flawed accounting practices, not
Marble Slab's UFOC, that caused Carousel's Creamery's financial down-
fall.1 58 Thus, the court of appeals allowed Carousel's Creamery to main-
tain a cause of action against Marble Slab for failing to make adequate
disclosures in the UFOC in accordance with federal law, but refused to
allow Carousel's Creamery to argue that the failure to make those disclo-
sures rose to the level of fraud or a violation of the DTPA.
153. Id. at 402-03.
154. Id. at 400.
155. Id. at 402. The court of appeals also noted that Carousel's Creamery engaged in
questionable accounting practices during the operation of its franchises. Id. at 400-01.
156. Id. at 391.
157. Id.




Because many franchise operations center around the food service in-
dustry, recent lawsuits claiming various "fast-food" restaurants were lia-
ble for their patrons' alleged weight gain set off alarms at the
headquarters of many food service franchisors. Apparently, the lawsuits
also set off alarms in the Texas House of Representatives and served as
the motivation behind House Bill 107.
House Bill 107, introduced on November 10, 2004, by Rep. Corbin Van
Arsdale, provides that no person may bring a state court civil action in
the State of Texas against a manufacturer or seller of food or a trade
association arising out of or related to an injury resulting from an "indi-
vidual's consumption of a food and weight gain, obesity, or any health
condition that is associated with an individual's weight gain or obes-
ity. 15 9 If enacted, House Bill 107 would shield franchisors from civil lia-
bility arising out of a patron's alleged weight gain or other health
conditions purportedly resulting from the consumption of food at a
franchised restaurant.
It should also be noted that House Bill 107 specifically provides that it
would not prevent a person from bringing an action based on either (1) a
willful violation of a federal or state statute where such violation is the
proximate cause of an injury related to an individual's weight gain, obes-
ity, or any health condition that is associated with an individual's weight
gain or obesity; or (2) a breach of an express contract or express warranty
in connection with the purchase of a food.160
In a significant case for franchisors, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
recently confirmed that a franchisor's right to terminate or suspend the
franchisee's operations for failure to comply with a franchise agreement's
minimum operational standards was not enough, standing alone, to sub-
ject the franchisor to vicarious liability for the franchisee's alleged
negligence.
In Fitz v. Days Inn Worldwide, Inc.,16 1 Fitz was hit by a tractor trailer as
the truck turned into a Days Inn parking lot. Fitz suffered significant
injuries and sued the truck driver, the owner of the tractor trailer, the
franchisee, and the franchisor-Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. ("DIW"). 162
DIW obtained summary judgment on the ground that it had not exercised
sufficient control over its independent contractor franchisee to be subject
to vicarious liability for the franchisee's negligence. 16 3 Fitz appealed.
The court of appeals examined the relevant standards for determining
whether a general contractor can be liable for the torts of its independent
contractor. A general contractor is liable for the torts of its independent
contractor when the general contractor retains the right to control the
159. Tex. H.B. 107, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
160. Id.
161. 147 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
162. Id. at 469-70.
163. Id. at 470.
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allegedly negligent activity.164 Control could be established in two ways:
(1) by evidence of a contractual agreement that assigned the premises
owner the right to control the activity; or (2) in the absence of a contrac-
tual agreement, by evidence that the owner of the premises exercised ac-
tual control over the manner in which the independent contractor's work
was performed.1 65 Fitz argued that DIW had contractual and actual con-
trol over the franchisee.
As the basis for establishing contractual control, Fitz pointed out that
the franchise agreements spelled out minimum standards that the fran-
chisee had to satisfy in order to continue operating as a DIW.166 Fitz
argued that DIW's right to suspend or terminate the franchise agree-
ments for the failure to satisfy the minimum standards gave DIW contrac-
tual control over the franchisee.
The court of appeals disagreed. The court of appeals first noted that
the franchise agreements explicitly stated that the franchisee was an inde-
pendent contractor. 167 The court then distinguished between the right to
set minimum standards and the right to exercise control. For a general
contractor to have control over an independent contractor, the general
contractor must have the right to control the means, methods, and details
of the independent contractor's work. 168 While the franchise agreements
granted DIW the right to set the standards or goals that the franchisee
had to meet, the franchise agreements did not explicitly grant DIW the
right to control how the franchisee met those standards. 169 Therefore,
the court of appeals held that the franchise agreements did not grant
DIW contractual control over the franchisee. 170 Similarly, the court of
appeals held that the franchisee's ability to suspend or terminate the fran-
chisee's operations for failure to comply with the franchise agreement's
minimum standards was not a sufficient level of actual control to subject
the franchisor to vicarious liability.
1 71
Finally, Fitz argued that DIW exercised actual control over the fran-
chisee because DIW had the right to inspect the premises and require the
franchisee to operate the franchise in accordance with the franchise
agreement.1 72 The court of appeals held that the right to inspect the
premises and to require compliance with the franchise agreements was
insufficient control to subject DIW to vicarious liability because there
was no evidence that, in requiring compliance with the franchisee agree-
ments, DIW controlled the franchisee's "method of work or its operative
164. Id. at 471 (citing Risner v. McDonald Corp., 18 S.W.3d 903, 906 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2000, pet. denied)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 472.
167. Id. at 473.
168. Id. at 472.
169. Id.





detail. '173 As a result, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of DIW.
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
COC Services, Ltd. v. CompUSA, Inc. 174 involved the alleged tortious
interference with a proposed master franchise agreement ("MFA").
COC Services, Ltd. ("COC") hoped to franchise CompUSA retail cen-
ters throughout Mexico. After a period of negotiations with CompUSA,
COC obtained a succession of three letters of intent from CompUSA,
which granted COC the exclusive right to identify and submit candidates
to become CompUSA franchisees in Mexico. Under the third letter of
intent, COC identified the Carso Group, a prominent Mexican business
enterprise, as a potential franchisee. 175
Although initial negotiations among COC, the Carso Group, and Com-
pUSA appeared promising, talks broke down in late September of 1999,
and the Carso Group stopped communicating with COC.176 The Carso
Group, however, continued negotiating directly with CompUSA regard-
ing franchising opportunities in Mexico. Following a meeting of the Com-
pUSA board of directors in November of 1999, the Dallas media
reported that CompUSA was speaking with the Carso Group regarding
franchising opportunities in Mexico. COC asked CompUSA about the
negotiations with the Carso Group, and CompUSA assured COC that the
press reports were referring to the proposed deal among COC, the Carso
Group, and CompUSA when, in fact, CompUSA began negotiating the
sale of CompUSA to the Carso Group. It soon became apparent to COC
that the Carso Group no longer had any interest in becoming a Com-
pUSA franchise under COC's MFA.177
Although COC eventually identified another potential franchisee, the
third letter of intent expired and CompUSA refused to renew the letter
and did not approve the franchisee. Shortly thereafter, the Carso Group
purchased CompUSA and COC filed suit for, inter alia, tortious interfer-
ence with the MFA and tortious interference with a prospective business
relationship. 178
1. Tortious Interference with the MFA
To prevail on a cause of action for tortious interference, the plaintiff
must show: (1) the existence of a contract subject to interference; (2) a
willful and intentional act of interference; (3) proximate cause; and (4)
actual damage or loss occurred. 179 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that
173. Id. at 474.
174. 150 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
175. Id. at 661.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 660-62.
178. Id. at 660.
179. Id. at 670 (citing Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. 1993)).
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COC failed to establish the existence of a contract subject to interference.
As an initial matter, the court of appeals pointed out that the parties
never signed the MFA and the letters of intent stated that COC had to
identify and CompUSA had to approve a franchisee, and the MFA and a
license agreement had to be signed before the MFA would become bind-
ing.180 None of these events occurred. Therefore, the MFA was
unenforceable.
The court of appeals also noted that the MFA was unenforceable be-
cause it lacked a material term.181 Specifically, the MFA failed to estab-
lish the minimum sales volume for the franchised stores and the number
of stores COC had to open during the effective dates of the MFA. As a
result, the court of appeals held that COC's claim for tortious interfer-
ence failed as a matter of law because COC could not establish that it had
a valid contract subject to interference. 182
2. Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relationships
COC also argued that CompUSA and its CEO tortiously interfered
with COC's prospective business relationship with the Carso Group by
secretly negotiating for franchises and other business opportunities with
the Carso Group during the effective dates of the final letter of intent.
183
To prevail on a cause of action for interference with a prospective busi-
ness relationship, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged in
some conduct that was independently tortious or unlawful.1 84 It is not
enough that the defendant's conduct was "sharp" or "unfair"; to be ac-
tionable the conduct must be independently unlawful. 185 Furthermore,
the unlawful conduct must have been a substantial factor in causing the
injury, without which the harm would not have occurred.186
After it became apparent that talks between COC and the Carso
Group had broken down, COC asked CompUSA for assistance in jump-
starting negotiations. 87 At that time, CompUSA suggested that COC
send the Carso Group a letter stating the COC had begun negotiating
with another possible franchisee. CompUSA also denied that it was en-
gaged in direct negotiations with the Carso Group when, in fact, Com-
pUSA was discussing franchising possibilities and other deals with the
Carso Group.1 88 COC argued that CompUSA's statement denying that it
had been negotiating with the Carso Group was false and COC relied on
that statement to its detriment. The court of appeals held that because
the talks between COC and the Carso Group broke down in September,
180. Id. at 663.
181. Id. at 664.
182. Id. at 665.








and the false statement allegedly made by CompUSA did not occur until
October, there was no evidence that COC would have entered into an
agreement with the Carso Group had COC not sent the letter regarding
other possible franchisees. 189
The court reasonably concluded that instructing COC to send the letter
to the Carso Group was not the "but for" cause of the break down in
talks between COC and the Carso Group. The court of appeals, how-
ever, failed to address whether and to what extent CompUSA's direct
negotiations with the Carso Group during the effective dates of the letter
of intent constituted a breach of the letter of intent and could be viewed
as independently unlawful. Given that the jury initially found that Com-
pUSA committed tortious interference with a prospective business rela-
tionship, franchisors would be well advised to tread carefully when
engaging in business negotiations with an entity conducting business
within an exclusive territory under a MFA or letter of intent contemplat-
ing the execution of a MFA.
VII. REMEDIES: LIMITATION OF DAMAGES
As discussed in COC Services, Ltd., CompUSA and COC entered into
negotiations for a MFA to establish CompUSA stores in Mexico. Also
involved in this transaction were the Carso defendants, an enterprise that
conducted numerous businesses in Mexico. Starting in 1997, COC ob-
tained three consecutive letters of intent from CompUSA, granting the
right to submit candidates to participate in a potential MFA for all of
Mexico. On COC's fourth letter of intent, it attached a form of a MFA
and a form of a license agreement, both of which would be subject to
CompUSA's approval. After several extensions, neither the MFA nor
the licensee agreement was executed. 190
In the midst of negotiations between CompUSA and COC, the Carso
defendants acquired stock in CompUSA. Eventually, they acquired fif-
teen percent of the stock and became involved in the negotiations with
the prospective franchise deal between CompUSA and COC. According
to COC, the Carso defendants made a "handshake deal" with COC to
form a joint venture during a meeting between the parties. The Carso
defendants later decided to reject the deal, and they ultimately acquired
CompUSA. COC consequently sued CompUSA and the Carso defend-
ants for breach of contract and tortious interference with an existing con-
tract. A jury found for COC; COC was awarded $90 million in damages
for lost profits and $270 million in punitive damages from CompUSA,
and $31.5 million in actual damages and $90 million in punitive damages
from the Carso defendants. The trial court granted judgment notwith-
standing the verdict in favor of CompUSA, which COC appealed. 191
189. Id.
190. Id. at 661.
191. Id. at 661-62.
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The appellate court held that the damages-limiting provision in the
MFA prevented COC from recovering lost-profits damages from Com-
pUSA, assuming the MFA itself was binding and enforceable. In the
MFA, the damages-limiting provision provided that "Franchisor, Master
Franchisee and the controlling principles of Master Franchisee hereby
waive any right to or claim of any punitive, exemplary, incidental, indi-
rect, special, consequential or other damages (including, without limita-
tion, loss of profits). u92
COC argued that CompUSA's statement in its affirmative defense did
not give COC notice that the provision limiting damages would be a basic
issue in the suit. CompUSA's affirmative defense plead that "Plaintiff's
claims are barred ... by the language of the putative agreements relied
upon by Plaintiff." The appellate court held that because Texas follows
the "fair notice" standard, and COC did not specially except to that state-
ment, COC contractually waived its right to lost-profit damage under the
unambiguous damages-limitation provision.
193
192. Id. at 677.
193. Id. at 677-78 (noting that the purpose of the fair notice rule is to give the opposing
party adequate notice of the facts to enable the opposing party to prepare a defense and to
know what testimony would be relevant for trial).
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